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2) A fact not sufficiently recognized is that the Fragments containing the term Xoyos are very few; omitting irrelevant occurrences, we are left with only half a dozen "Logos-Fragments". We reproduce these here according to the Diels-Kranz edition10 along with our translations. (In transliterating 6oyos in our translations below we have tried to avoid prejudicing the interpretation; further, both here and later we have avoided as much as possible textual and other technical issues.) Frg Although this logos ever exists, men are ignorant1 both before they hear and after they have once heard. For even though all things happen in accordance with this logos, they are like men of no experience when they experience words and deeds such as these, when I distinguish each thing according to its nature and explain how it is. Other men are as unaware of what they do when awake as they forget what they do when asleep. Therefore it is necessary to follow the common. But although the logos is common, the many live as if they had a private understanding.
Frg. 45
Ivxjl 7Trelpara uiv OVK av eiSvpoto, Tracrav 1i7rTopEv6oL,Evo;0 6v' o roW f3aOivv Xoyov EXEL.
You would not discover the soul's boundaries though traveling all the way, so deep is its logos. Having listened not to me but to the logos, it is wise to concur that all things are one. The logos which they associate with most closely, this they are estranged from; and the things they encounter daily, these seem alien to them. The soul has a logos which increases itself.
3) It is possible to explain the cosmic or metaphysical interpretation of Heraclitus' Logos as an overinterpretation-eisegesis-by the Stoics, as indeed happened also in the case of the Stoics' attribution to Heraclitus of their own doctrine of an KirnpwOaL' or final universal conflagration. 4) Had Heraclitus in fact employed 6oyos with the sense of cosmic principle it is unbelievable that neither Plato nor Aristotle (both of whom give suitable attention to Heraclitus) would fail to get mileage from it. The fact is that not until the Stoics do we encounter such a use of X6yos. 5) Bertrand Russell in his History of Western Philosophy makes no mention whatever of the Logos doctrine in his chapter on Heraclitus.
These, then, are Glasson's arguments against the alleged cosmic or metaphysical Logos concept in Heraclitus. Now some of Glasson's observations are relevant, but not one of them or all of them together are sufficient to overturn what has now become an almost universally accepted view of Heraclitus' Logos. To take the last and certainly weakest of Glasson's arguments first, a New Testament scholar writing on these matters might not, but should, know that Bertrand Russell's History of Philosophy is hardly a high-water mark of historical scholarship. Certainly it is no authority in the area of the pre-Socratics where technical philological and historical-critical issues must be addressed more than in all the rest of the history of philosophy put together.
As for evidence-or lack of it-for Heraclitus' cosmic Logos in Plato and Aristotle, it must be conceded that these are undeniably of the above six Logos-Fragments it would be necessary to allot to this concept a fundamental role in Heraclitus' philosophy. The unity of the Heraclitean Fragments-the comprehension, continuity and progression of ideas17 -is such that the Logos idea, if not the word itself, pervades the whole. It is therefore artificial to delimit the Logos-Fragments to only those in which the word itself occurs, and at least the following Fragments (and no doubt others) which otherwise express, clarify, and relate the Logos idea18 should be added to Glasson's list above: One thing, the only wise, does and does not wish to be called by the name of Zeus.
Frg. 41
E'v TO c00oov, ETraT'raca a yV/fa7)V, OK)2 EKvgEpv'ap'f rravTa 8tc 7TCavTOv.
The wise is one thing: to know the purpose which steers all things through all things.
Frg. 54 apiLuovl) a0a& v<' avep7)% KPEL7TWv.
An invisible harmony is stronger than a visible one. 17 We would venture that the hundred-and-thirty-odd Fragments of Heraclitus provide evidence of the earliest extant "philosophical system." It is not only possible but natural to divide the Heraclitean Fragments into general blocks dealing with different but always related aspects of Heraclitus' thought; e.g., the Logos-Fragments, the Fire-Fragments, the Flux-Fragments, the Strife-Fragments, and the Unity-Fragments. Of course many Fragments fall into more than one of these categories. Of all those whose words I have heard, none reaches the point as to recognize that the wise is separated from all things.
Frg. 113 fVvdv i EcL 7TacTL To kPOVEELV.
Thought is common to all. It is necessary for those who would speak with common sense to be empowered by that which is common to all, just as a city is empowered by law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are fed by one divine law. For it rules as much as it wishes, and is sufficient for all and more than enough. How these thinkers arrive at an interpretation so different from that of Burnet, Gigon, and Taylor is of course a long story involving indeed their various expositions of the Heraclitean Fragments as a whole. We can hardly take up and consider such material here in our "report" and in any case our only purpose has been to show how Glasson's argument from authority can now be met by another and better argument from authority.
II
We conclude with some observations of our own concerning the interpretation and rendering of Heraclitus' Logos, and its possible relation to that of the Fourth Evangelist.
First, and somewhat ironically, the Heraclitean Logos probably is, after all, best rendered as "Word." On the other hand such a "Word" There is nothing to prevent Heraclitus from distinguishing his own discourse from the inspired and revelatory Truth vouchsafed to him. Likewise, the priestess at Delphi presumably could have distinguished her ordinary discourse from the prophetic words uttered through her by the inspiration of the oracle; Ezekiel surely did not confuse his own words with the "word of the Lord" which "came to him" on many occasions and which he proclaimed; as God's mouthpiece, St. Paul expressly distinguished his own opinions from those commandments which he received from the Lord; etc. There is much in and about Heraclitus that suggests that he too saw himself as the medium of some sort of religious proclamation and redemptive truth.
The oracular character of Heraclitus' utterances is well attested: Heraclitus himself appears somewhat preoccupied with the oracles (Frgs. 92 and 93) and in Frg. 93 seems in fact to liken his own expression to that of the Delphic oracle ("The Lord whose oracle is that at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals but gives a sign"), and it is not for nothing that from the third century B.C. he was known as 6 cOKOTELVO, the Obscure, and later as 6 atlvKrTr, the Riddler.34 Further, one must ask whether Parmenides' poem with its explicit claim to be a religious revelation35 may not reflect on Heraclitus. Guthrie in fact asserts without the slightest hesitation that "Parmenides was at one with Heraclitus in claiming a prophetic or apocalyptic authority for his teaching."36 I submit that it is this prophetic self-understanding that lies behind the distinction in Frg. 50 between Heraclitus' own words and the divine Logos, Word, that he also speaks. Of course the question may be raised: Since there appears to be no place in Heraclitus' philosophy for a personal God, who is it that does the "inspiring," who is it that endows him with his authority? Here I wish to skirt a number of problems by arguing that, at the least, thinkers like Heraclitus and Parmenides in representing their work as religious proclamations are resorting to a device or image which, though perhaps not intended literally, effectively distinguishes the Truth-absolute, universal, salvific, etc.-which they think they have penetrated.
Further, we must reckon seriously with the fact that x6yoa does occur in the Fragments with the simple, straightforward meaning of "word". This is not to deny that X6oyo; is employed by Heraclitus in many ways, including some quasi-metaphysical ways: In Frg. 39 it means something like "reputation" or "significance"; in Frgs. 45 and 115 it appears to mean "measure"; in Frg. 31 it means "proportion". But on numerous occasions it means simply "word," "discourse," "teaching," or the like, as in Frgs. 87 and 108. To this latter list I think we must add also Frg. 50 and the all-important Frg. 1. It has already been argued that the X6yo; of Frg. 50 refers to a (prophetic) "Word," and now I wish to suggest the same for Frg. 1. Everyone agrees that Heraclitus employs Xdyo,; with its special Heraclitean sense in Frg. 1, if anywhere. But here too it must be noted that the X6yos is said explicitly to be something heard, and a few lines later is linked (?) to references to Heraclitus' words, exposition, explanation, etc. Then too we must take into account that in all probability Frgs. 1 and 2 originally stood together as the introduction to Heraclitus' work.37 The continuity of the two Fragments is suggested by the connecting 8t6 that begins Frg. 2 and certain parallelisms both of ideas and sentence structure;38 and both Fragments together bear every mark of a prefatory statement. If indeed Frg. 1 stood originally at the opening of Heraclitus' work, then, even though the cosmic-metaphysical interpretation of X6oyoa would not thereby necessarily be excluded, the prophetic-Word interpretation certainly would be natural: Heraclitus confronts his reader at the very start with a 37 Whether Heraclitus actually wrote a book may be irrelevant here. For even if not, one could still argue the connection (in oral tradition) between fragments. There is evidence from the ancients for Heraclitus' "work," generally called "On Nature". But this is discounted, for example, by Kirk who prefers to speak rather of Heraclitus' "sayings" and who attributes many of the connective particles in the Fragments to later sources (Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments, 7). statement about the power and authority of his discourse. The cumulative evidence thus suggests that here also in Frg. 1 Xoyos means "word," although we should no doubt render it a "Word."
If, then, kdyos in Frgs. 50 and 1 means the prophetic Word which Heraclitus proclaims about the universe, then Guthrie is correct when he says that according to these two Fragments the Xdyo, is "something which one hears"; he is correct when he says further that it is "something with an existence independent of him who gives it verbal expression"; but he is misleading when he says that it is "that which regulates all events, a kind of universal law of becoming."39 Rather, it is the Word or Teaching or Proclamation about the ultimate principle which regulates all things, not "according to" which but rather "in accordance with" which all things come to pass (as Guthrie himself translates the KaTa of Frg. 140). This ultimate principle itself is more likely represented by the differing words or images "the wise" (Frg. 32), "purpose" (Frg. 41), "war" (Frg. 53), "invisible harmony" (Frg. 54), "God" (Frg. 67), "the Erinyes, servants of Justice" (Frg. 94), "divine law" (Frg. 114), and "nature" (Frg. 123). Actually, it may be a bit too narrow to say that Heraclitus' Word was about this ultimate principle or law. More likely he understood it as the Word about the nature and meaning of the whole cosmos, and as including the doctrines of the underlying fire, universal change, unity born of tension and diversity, as well as the divine Law which governs all.
It was not in his rendering of oXyo? as "word" that Burnet erred, and certainly not in his emphasis on the prophetic character of this Word, but in his restriction of this Word to Heraclitus' treatise itself (it is "simply the discourse of Heraclitus himself,"41-a book, a writing, a thing), and his failure to relate it adequately to the metaphysical content of Heraclitus' philosophy as a whole.42 The Word of Heraclitus is that Truth about the cosmos which the more recent interpreters have done so much to clarify. In this way I would attempt to relate kdyo'; as "Word" to Heraclitus' belief in a cosmic-metaphysical law and to his understanding of the whole cosmos as ruled by that law-the Logos is the inspired proclamation about that reality.
The most recent full study of the pre-Socratics is that of Jonathan Barnes, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers.43 It will be useful at this point to 39 Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, 1. 425. 2) The divinity of the Logos. For Heraclitus the Logos is identified in some way with the underlying (divine) fire (Frg. 30), it might be identified with the divine law (Frg. 114), it is in some way appropriately called "Zeus" (Frg. 32), and it is regarded as the coincidence of opposites as is also God (Frg. 67). John's identification of the Logos with God is a straightforward and unambiguous "the Logos was God" (1:1).
3 4) The creative work of the Logos. Heraclitus says, "All things come into being according to the Logos" (Frg. 1); John says, "All things came into being through him," i.e., the Logos (1:3).
5) The universal presence of the Logos. Heraclitus says that the Logos is "common to all" (Frg. 2) and related to it the "never-setting" sun (Frg. 16); John says of his Logos that it "illumines every man" (1:9) and is "the life that was the light of men" (1:4).
6) The necessity offollowing the Logos. For Heraclitus "it is necessary to follow the Logos" (Frg. 2); John says that only those "believing in his name" are children of God (1:12).
7) The rejection of the Logos. Heraclitus says that "men fail to understand" the Logos (Frg. 1); according to John "the darkness never grasped" the light of the Logos (1:5).54 Kranz regards it as "besonders erstaunlich" that this idea is repeated by both: Heraclitus says, further, that men "lack experience" of the Logos (Frg. 1); according to John, "The world did not know him" (1:10). While these similarities may seem striking to some, they will fail to impress many NT scholars who find even more striking parallels in OT hochmala-ooia themes, or in the speculative Wisdom literature of intertestamental Judaism, or in the Logos doctrines of Philo Judeaus, or in gnostic thought, etc. Then, too, the "syncretistic" interpretation, as in Kranz's statement that wenn wir .. hier mit solcher Entschiedenheit den Zusammenhang der Prologgedanken mit griechischer Philosophie betonen, so sind wir uns dennoch dariber klar, dass wir damit nur eine Komponente in diesem komplizierten Gebilde aus der Zeit des religiisen Synkretismus bezeichnet haben,55 along with his references to oriental speculation, Orphic-Pythagorean and gnostic teachings, labors too much under the spell of the old Religionsgeschichtliche Schule. More important, perhaps, one must reckon not only with similarities between Heraclitus and John but also with dissimilarities, and these appear sometimes quite irreconcilable. Whether, or to what degree, those other alleged sources of the Johannine Logos can be reconciled with these last two lines of criticism may also be a good question, but one which cannot be considered here.
Our observations and conclusions may be summarized as follows: (1) A much stronger case can be presented for the cosmic/metaphysical interpretation of Heraclitus' Logos ("Reason") than has sometimes been thought, and this interpretation is now maintained virtually by all pre-Socratic scholars, Barnes being a notable exception. (2) There are, 54 KaTaa,,lpavwo (here a gnomic aorist KaTEXaapfv) can mean both to seize, overpower, etc. and to grasp with the mind and thus to understand. 55 Kranz, "Der Logos Heraklits und der Logos des Johannes," 92. It is revealing that Kranz refers to Bultmann as "der heute beste Kenner des Johannesevangeliums" (93).
